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Summary. Inadequate service availability is the top concern when employing Cloud
computing. It has been recognized that zero downtime is impossible for large-scale
Internet services. By learning from the previous and others’ mistakes, nevertheless,
it is possible for Cloud vendors to minimize the risk of future downtime or at least
keep the downtime short. To facilitate summarizing lessons for Cloud providers,
we performed a systematic survey of public Cloud service outage events. This paper
reports the result of this survey. In addition to a set of findings, our work generated a
lessons framework by classifying the outage root causes. The framework can in turn
be used to arrange outage lessons for reference by Cloud providers. By including
potentially new root causes, this lessons framework will be smoothly expanded in
our future work.
Key words: Cloud Computing, Cloud Service Outage, Outage Lessons, Public
Cloud Service, Systematic Survey
1.1 Introduction
Cloud computing has increasingly become popular in the present business
scenario, with various benefits ranging from convenience to economy. Many
organizations are using Cloud to automate their service delivering. However,
there are thorny issues and risks in using the Cloud [1]. Among the numerous
and different concerns [2], [3], [4], the risk of inadequate service availability
has been identified as the top obstacle to adoption of Cloud computing [5], [4].
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Given the reality that it is hard to eliminate the downtime of the data center
systems behind Cloud services [6], most of the current studies emphasized
data/system backup from the perspective of Cloud customers. For example,
employing multiple Cloud providers was suggested as being a plausible solu-
tion to very high availability service delivery [5].
Although there is no absolute means for preventing outage [6], it is still
worthwhile for Cloud vendors to learn from the existing mistakes, so as to
minimize the risk of future downtime or at least keep the downtime short [7].
Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, few comprehensive investigations
into service outages can be found in the literature. In other words, there is
a lack of systematic discussion about outage lessons from the perspective of
Cloud providers.
As an initial step to summarizing lessons for Cloud providers, we performed
a survey of public Cloud service outages by using the Systematic Literature
Review (SLR) approach. This paper reports the results of that survey together
with the methodology of this systematic survey. Due to the limit of resource
and time, our work only focused on the top five Cloud vendors. The collected
outage data can then be viewed as the representative of all the existing Cloud
service outage events. The corresponding data analysis was unfolded to answer
four predefined research questions about the outage host, duration/frequency,
location, and root cause.
The contribution of this work is twofold. First, based on the data analysis,
we highlighted a set of findings (e.g. two influential factors related to out-
age locations, cf. Subsection 1.3.3) when answering the predefined research
questions. Second, by classifying the outage root causes, this study essentially
generated a framework for accommodating outage lessons for Cloud providers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 briefly
introduces the methodology used to perform this survey. Section 1.3 describes
the survey result that answers the predefined research questions. Section 1.4
summarizes a set of sample lessons driven by the root cause classification.
Conclusions and some future work are discussed in Section 1.5.
1.2 Methodology of this Survey
Cloud service outage events have been generally reported as news or posts
scattering over web media, technical websites, blogs, etc. To efficiently per-
form this survey, we borrowed SLR approach to collect, assess, and analyze the
relevant outage reports. As the main methodology applied for Evidence-Based
Software Engineering (EBSE) [8], SLR has been widely accepted as a stan-
dard and systematic approach to investigation of specific research questions.
Although the study objects here are not academic publications, this survey
may still benefit from the rigorous review process defined by SLR. Following
the guidelines of SLR [9], we did this work mainly covering three steps:
• Identify research questions and prepare the survey.
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Table 1.1. Research Questions
ID Research Question Main Motivation
RQ1 Which Cloud provider experienced
service outage?
To identify the outage host.
RQ2 When and for how long did the
service outage take place?
To identify the outage
duration/frequency.
RQ3 Where did the service outage
happen?
To identify the outage location.
RQ4 What is the root cause of the
service outage?
To identify the outage reason.
• Collect relevant outage reports and extract data.
• Analyze the extracted data and report the result.
1.2.1 Survey Preparation
Similar to preparing an SLR, the preparation of this study generated a review
protocol based on a pilot survey. Due to the limit of space, here we only
highlight the research questions defined in the review protocol, as listed in
Table 1.1.
1.2.2 Report Collection and Data Extraction
Unlike exploring various academic libraries in normal SLR, the outage report
searching in this study only resorted to the Google search engine.
Furthermore, we employed three constraints for the outage report collec-
tion:
(1) This study only focused on public Cloud to make our effort closer
to industry needs. Given the large number of players in the market
[10], we further limited our concentration to a small set of top Cloud
providers (cf. Subsection 1.3.1).
(2) Considering that the term “Cloud computing” started to gain pop-
ularity in 2006 [11], we only collected reports posted between 2007
and 2012. This study did not trace the old outage cases, though some
Cloud services like Gmail or Hotmail have existed for a longer time.
(3) This study distinguished unplanned outages from all kinds of Cloud
service downtime. In particular, we collected outage information only
from the third-party media, so as to ignore the tiny issues that at-
tracted little public attention.
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Table 1.2. Top 5 Cloud Providers
Overall Rank Cloud Provider Number of Occurences
1 Amazon 24
2 Rackspace 19
3 Microsoft 18
4 Google 17
4 Saleforce.com 17
In total, we collected 112 Cloud service outage events. By reading the
outage details, we extracted useful data related to the pre-defined research
questions for further analysis.5
1.2.3 Data Analysis
The primary data analysis here is to carry out quantitative statistics based on
the qualitative data descriptions. Given particular phenomena, we tried to give
further explanations or suggestions. Moreover, the root causes of public Cloud
service outage have been classified and arranged into a lessons framework for
Cloud providers.
1.3 Result of this Survey
The survey results are organized and reported following the sequence of an-
swers to the predefined research questions.
1.3.1 RQ1: Which Cloud providers experienced service outage?
As mentioned previously, numerous public Cloud providers have been increas-
ingly available in the market. It is thus nearly impossible to collect the outage
data of different Cloud services all at once. Therefore, we decided to concen-
trate on the top Cloud providers only. Since different Cloud rankings have
been published by different parties at different time, it would be more ratio-
nal to combine those various opinions. By trying to exhaustively explore the
web media and technical websites, we firstly gathered 34 rankings of public
Cloud vendors.6 Then, we rearranged the listed vendor names according to
5 The extracted Cloud service outage data are shown
online: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=
0AtKzcoAAmi43dEtPVVlIQ0NRblJiTV9SOGNJb2ttN0E
6 The third-party rankings of public Cloud providers are
listed online: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=
0AtKzcoAAmi43dE1TaTJINUdFM0hqVVQ3dy0wX0M3R2c
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Fig. 1.1. Outage distribution over providers and years.
their occurrence numbers. As such, we finally achieved an overall Cloud rank-
ing combining the individuals. Note that we deliberately excluded the Cloud
rankings shown in the personal blogs. We found that most of the blogs were
either criticized for bias or commented as copies of the others.
Given the limited resource and time, we further narrowed our focus down
to the top five public Cloud providers, as listed in Table 1.2. The collected
data (cf. Fig. 1.1) shows that each of the Cloud providers has suffered from
considerable service outages, not to mention that there are also unreported
downtime events. Such a phenomenon confirms the opinion that service out-
age happens to any Cloud provider sooner or later no matter how smart or
successful the provider is [12], [7]. To reduce the risks of Cloud service outage,
building redundancy could be a generic strategy for both Cloud vendors and
customers [13].
1.3.2 RQ2: When and for how long did the service outage take
place?
Through the outage distribution illustrated in Fig. 1.1, we also show that
the top five Cloud providers suffer from service outages nearly every year.
Two exceptions are: there was no outage report of Salesforce.com in 2007,
and no report of Rackspace in 2012. The reason could be that Salesforce.com
introduced its Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) in late 2007 [14], while Rackspace
started expanding its old data center at the beginning of 2012 [15].
Furthermore, Cloud service outages could happen at any month. In par-
ticular, Amazon’s northern Virginia data center seems more likely subjected
to power outage during June (in 2008, 2009, and 2012), when thunderstorms
start appearing frequently across Virginia every year [16].
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Fig. 1.2. Outage distribution over six-hour scales.
Table 1.3. Typical Downtime of Cloud Services
Cloud Service Year Downtime Availability
Amazon S3 2008 ∼ 36.5 hours ∼ 99.58%
Amazon EC2 2011 ∼ 8.5 days ∼ 97.67%
Rackspace Storage 2011 > 48 hours < 99.45%
Microsoft Azure 2012 > 26.5 hours < 99.7%
Google Gmail 2008 ∼ 71.5 hours ∼ 99.18%
Saleforce.com Heroku 2011 ∼ 104 hours ∼ 98.81%
As for the outage duration, we grouped the collected events into a set of six-
hour scales, as illustrated in Fig. 1.2. Interestingly, the Cloud service outages
lasted less than 12 hours and the others roughly follow the 80-20 distribution.
In particular, we calculated several typical Cloud services’ downtime and the
corresponding availability, as shown in Table 1.3. It is clear that each Cloud
provider has experienced violation of its Service Level Agreements (SLA) dur-
ing particular service years. Note that the service downtime here refers to the
sum of worst-case outage durations. For example, although Gmail only suf-
fered an average of 10 to 15 minutes of downtime per month in 2008 [17], an
unlucky user could have lost the service for around 71.5 hours according to
our collected data.
Therefore, we suggest that the industry should help educate Cloud con-
sumers to “expect the unexpected” before using outages. It is understandable
that Cloud providers tend to particularly emphasize their SLA for the pur-
pose of market hype. However, the ideal claims could mislead customers and
in turn spoil the Cloud ecosphere. For example, users have considered that
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Cloud “downtime is completely unacceptable” [18], while the truth is that
there is no absolute means for preventing downtime when running large-scale
Internet services [6].
1.3.3 RQ3: Where did the service outage happen?
When extracting data, we found that a large proportion of outage events did
not disclose their geographical locations, especially the Software-as-a-Service
(SaaS) ones. Only Amazon- and Rackspace-related outage reports mostly
specified the data centers where the service outages happened. Therefore, we
mainly focused on Amazon and Rackspace to answer this research question.
Given the reports specifying locations, 72.2% of Amazon outages (13/18) took
place in its northern Virginia data center, while 72.7% of Rackspace outages
(8/11) happened in its Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) data center. By roughly
investigating these two places, we summarized two influential factors related
to the locations of Cloud data centers, namely climate and time.
Climate Influence: As mentioned previously, power outages occurred with
thunderstorms three times (once a year) in Amazon’s northern Virginia data
center. In fact, thunderstorms are a frequent concern in Virginia, although
northern Virginia experiences the least number of such storms [16]. Recall
that “away from natural disasters” is one of the principles of site selection
for building a data center [19], Amazon may have put this data center at risk
from the beginning.
Time Influence: As one of the oldest Rackspace data centers, DFW data
center has experienced a series of equipment failures [15]. Interestingly, the
northern Virginia data center is also one of the Amazon’s oldest. We are then
concerned with two points for this phenomenon: on the one hand, old data
centers may involve immature techniques and mechanisms from the beginning;
on the other hand, a data center could gradually become vulnerable with
equipment aging as time goes by. As such, a natural suggestion is that the
Cloud data centers should be upgraded regularly.
1.3.4 RQ4: What is the root cause of the service outage?
Given the collected reports, it is impossible to identify the root cause of ev-
ery Cloud service outage event. For example, Cloud providers may decline to
supply technical details (e.g. Google News outage on September 22, 2009).
Therefore, we only focused on the 78 out of 112 events with outage cause
explanations. In addition, since an outage event may be a result of a com-
bination of causes (e.g., Microsoft Office365 outage on November 13, 2012)
or a close cause chain (e.g., Amazon EBS outage on October 22, 2012), we
further broke the 78 outage explanations into 99 cause units.7 By classifying
7 The breakdown of the outage causes are listed online: https://docs.google.
com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AtKzcoAAmi43dDdCUjhuTlZiaXJXWEZNQ1FGTTB2blE
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Table 1.4. Outage Root Cause Classification
Root Cause of Public Cloud Service Outage
Direct Power Cut/Interruption
Power Outage
Hardware
Breaker
Bus Duct
Cable
Electrical Ground
Power Distribution Unit (PDU)
Programmable Logic Controllers
Transfer Switch
Utility Distribution Network
Human Mistake
Natural Disaster
Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) Issue
Vehicle Accident
Routing/Network Issue
DNS Error
Hardware
Core Device
Infrastructure
Routing Device
Human Mistake
Misconfiguration
Misoperation
Request Flood
Software
Bug
Communication Error
HTTP Error
(Other) System Issue
Database Error
Hack
DDoS Attack
Virus
Hardware
Chiller Failure
Recent Change
Server Down
Human Mistake
Misconfiguration
Misoperation
Overload
Memory Leak
Request Flood
Software
Bug
Recent Change
Storage Error
Third-party Outage
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Fig. 1.3. Distribution of several typical root causes. Note that, for the convenience
of comparison between root causes, we summed up the outage events with the same
sub-category name, although they could be under different primary cause classes.
those units (cf. Table 1.4), we show a set of typical and relatively frequent
root causes of Cloud service outages, as illustrated in Fig. 1.3.
In general, Power Outage and Routing/Network Issue are two common
classes of Cloud service outage causes. The large amount of routing/network
issues may not be surprising because the Clouds are inherently associated
with intranet and Internet, but the power supply behind Cloud services seems
more vulnerable than we expected. As for the details of power outage, it can
be confirmed that Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) is not uninterrupt-
ible enough [20]; thunderstorm (lightning strike) is currently the only natural
threat to power equipments; while interestingly, vehicle accident is not rare
for being a reason of power interruption, and we thus suggest that the physical
barrier security rule [21] should be applied not only to the Cloud data center
buildings but also to the outside power infrastructures.
The other three common cause sub-categories are Hardware, Software, and
Human Mistake. Each of the three categories covers more than one fifth outage
events. In particular, the Third-party Outage refers to the scenario that an
outage event happens due to other Cloud service outages (e.g., Heroku outage
on July 10, 2012). This cause type suggests that not only Cloud consumers
but also providers may suffer from the “Cloud ripple effect” [22].
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Overall, the root cause classification shown in Table 1.4 can be viewed as
a lessons framework for Cloud providers (cf. Section 1.4). The large amount of
lessons learnt from the existing Cloud service outage events can be naturally
organized by using this framework. Through smooth expansion, we may con-
tinually develop this framework to cover new type of Cloud service outages
and accommodate new lessons.
1.4 Sample Lessons from Cloud Service Outage
Driven by the outage root cause classification (cf. Table 1.4), we have tried to
summarize and rationalize the existing lessons from the Cloud service outage
events. Due to the limit of space, here we only show some coarse-grained
sample lessons that can be matched up to those primary cause classes.
1.4.1 Watch the Power
It has been claimed that “the worst, most sustained downtime has always
been caused by power issues”, while losing power in data centers will happen
someday inevitably [23]. Therefore, we elaborate relatively more on the power-
related lessons as follows.
Any single piece of power equipments can fail.
The failed equipment piece could incur cascading events and result in a large
scale of power outage. For example, a failed bus duct prevented proper oper-
ation of Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) (cf. Rackspace outage on July
7, 2009); an electrical ground fault and short circuit in a major power dis-
tribution panel interrupted power to a particular Availability Zone (cf. Ama-
zon outage on May 8, 2010); the failure of switches in the electrical infras-
tructure prevented transfer of electrical load between different power sources
(cf. Rackspace outage on June 29, 2009); a breaker failure in the switch board
affected all downstream power distribution units (PDUs) (cf. Rackspace out-
age on November 11, 2007); while failures in a PDU resulted in a portion of
servers losing power (cf. Amazon outage on December 9, 2009).
Moreover, some power equipment failures could happen externally. For
example, there could be unexpected power cut (e.g., Rackspace outage on
December 5, 2007); and even small problems with utility distribution system
(e.g., Amazon outage on June 14, 2012) can cause power outage.
Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) is not uninterruptible
enough.
Given the possibly vulnerable power equipment, employing redundant/backup
power systems would be a natural strategy to reduce power issues. An ideal
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mechanism could be “multiple power supplies in every server connected to 2
PDUs connected to 2 different generators” [24]. Considering the cost-benefit
tradeoffs, one of the most practical and common efforts is to use UPS. Unfor-
tunately, this study shows that UPSes could also become a huge single point
of failure. Interestingly, UPS has been criticized for its deceptive designation:
Once out of commission, UPS can be a solid barrier between Cloud service and
generator power [20]. Therefore, regular testing should be further emphasized
even for “uninterruptible” power equipments.
Backup power systems should be tested regularly.
Recall the Amazon outage on June 14, 2012, even with the correct setup of
generator fallback, the power backup mechanism could still fail unexpectedly
in some circumstance. It has been pointed out that the lack of regular testing
is the backend flaw, although the power interruption could be the head of a
cause chain [25]. In fact, regularly testing the backup power systems has been
strongly suggested by industry [23].
1.4.2 Be Pessimistic about every Service Component
Given the listed root causes of public Cloud service outage (cf. Table 1.4), it is
clear that various hardware and software issues can knock out Cloud services,
not to mention the numerous routing/network problems (cf. Fig. 1.3). As such,
it would be valuable and necessary for people to realize and understand that
“Clouds are made of components that can fail” [26]. As mentioned in Section
1.3.2, Cloud consumers should be ready to “expect the unexpected” outages,
while Cloud providers should rethink and carefully build service levels that
actually guarantee services from the perspective of consumers [27]. Note that
understanding such a reality does not mean to ask people to passively live with
it. On the contrary, being pessimistic about every service component requires
both Cloud providers and consumers to fine tune their processes and responses
to failures, by conducting full-blown load tests of their failover mechanisms
[26], [28].
1.4.3 Minimize the Chain Reaction
As previously mentioned, we find that an event of Cloud service outage could
often comprise a combination of causes or a close cause chain. Some discussions
revealed that “the stress of failure will trigger a cascade of other failures” [26].
One of the logics behind this advice could be that human beings tend to make
more mistakes under pressure. Inspired by the fire drills that help train people
to deal with the event of an emergency, frequent load tests of failover plans
may help engineers get familiar with what they need to do to reduce human
mistakes when fixing Cloud service outages.
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When it comes to the “Cloud ripple effect” [22] resulted from third-party
outages, we may draw similar lessons for both Cloud service providers and con-
sumers. In fact, the secondary or tertiary Cloud service providers are indeed
customers of their primary providers. Interestingly, a consensus on surviving
third-party outages is all about redundancy. Following the terminology from
Amazon, the suggestion is to spread the load across multiple availability zones
and across multiple regions [29], [30]; in general, the suggestion is to spread
across multiple data centers and across multiple primary providers [29], [30]; a
more aggressive suggestion is even to spread across public and private Clouds
[31]. There is little doubt that such load spreading could be complicated and
expensive, however, it would be a worthwhile mechanism if the Cloud services
are serious about customer satisfaction [32].
1.4.4 Open the Outage Details
According to the collected outage data, we find that many events of public
Cloud service outage did not disclose the details. It is natural that the “public
Cloud” implies some loss of control and visibility from the customers’ perspec-
tive. Nevertheless, delivering enough in-depth information has been identified
crucial for customers especially during the outage [27], [33], [34]. More im-
portantly, opening outage details would also be beneficial for Cloud service
providers. There are two reasons for this.
Firstly, rapid and clear lines of communication have been proved a suc-
cessful crisis management model. The existing case studies show that keeping
customers updated can significantly drop off negative commentary [34]. Given
the timely disclosure of an outage and the remedy activities thereafter, most
customers would still forgive the Cloud service providers for their failings [35].
Secondly, disclosure of outage details can help boost the entire Cloud com-
puting industry. A positive observation on Cloud service outages is that those
unfortunate events also provided opportunities to learn from them [28]. By
exposing what went wrong, each outage essentially acts as an education for
Cloud service providers with how to prevent it from happening again or how
to adapt when an outage occurs. For example, the existing Cloud failures have
provided useful lessons in disaster planning and infrastructural designing for
redundancy, which would reduce future risks and eventually make the Cloud
stronger [7], [36].
1.5 Conclusions and Future Work
There is no doubt that an outage of Cloud services happens sooner or later.
As such, it is necessary and worthwhile for Cloud providers to learn from the
previous and others’ mistakes to minimize the risks of future downtime [7].
This paper reports a systematic survey of public Cloud service outages. In
addition to revealing findings based on the quantitative analysis, this study
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finally establishes an education framework for learning from Cloud service
outage. We also list a set of coarse-grained sample lessons to show that the
established framework can help guide people to arrange and/or refer to the
relevant knowledge.
The main limitation of this work is the completeness of the Cloud service
outage data. On the one hand, we only focused on a small amount of public
Cloud vendors. On the other hand, we only collected outage events reported
by web media and technical websites. Therefore, our future work will further
collect outage events of more Cloud vendors and gradually expand the lessons
framework. Meanwhile, we will continue summarizing the outage lessons and
arrange them within the aforementioned framework for reference by Cloud
providers.
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